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LeVerrier: People v Berg

SELF INCRIMINATION
U. S. CONST. amend V:
No person shall.., be compelled in any criminalcase to be
a witness againsthimself ....
N.Y. CONST. art.1,§ 6:
No person shall.., be compelled in any criminalcase to be
a witness againsthimself ....

COURT OF APPEALS

People v. Berg'
(decided February 23, 1999)
On September 30, 1995, Berg drove her car into a ditch near the
residence of off-duty State Trooper, Andrew Lindeman
("Lindeman"). 2 Awakened by the accident, Lindeman went
outside to investigate Berg asked him to assist her in removing
the vehicle from the ditch and not to call the police.4 Lindeman
smelled alcohol on Berg and observed that her speech was slurred.5
When it became evident that the vehicle was inoperable, Berg left
the scene.6
Following a brief search, Berg was found a short distance down
the road by State Trooper Keane ("Keane"), hiding in the bushes.7
People v. Berg, 92 N.Y.2d 701,708 N.E2d 979,685 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1999).
People v. Berg, 239 A.D.2d 97,670 N.Y.S.2d 57 (3d Dep't 1998).
3 id.
4
id.
2

5

Id.

6 Berg, 239 A.D.2d at 98, 670 N.Y.S.2d at 58.

7Id.
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At that time, she was placed in police custody and returned to the
accident scene.8 Thereafter, Keane proceeded with Berg to her
home to obtain her driver's license.9 When he discovered that
Berg had provided a false identity, he took her to the police
- station. - Here, Keane .asked.her to ,performsobriety, tests which
she refused."
Then, Keane placed her under arrest and
administered Miranda12 warnings. 3 Berg was indicted for the
crimes of driving while intoxicated (as a felony) and aggravated
unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle.14
A Huntley hearing 15 was held regarding the inadmissibility of,
6
inter alia, defendant's refusal to perform the sobriety tests.'
Following the hearing, the County Court ruled that evidence of
defendant's refusal to take the tests was not admissible in the
8

Id.
1d.
10 Berg, 239 A.D.2d at 98, 670 N.Y.S.2d at 58.
11Id.

9

12 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Supreme Court held that
statements from custodial interrogation of a defendant may not be used unless
the prosecution uses procedural safeguards necessary to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination. "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned
that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used
as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of any attorney,
either retained or appointed." Id. at 444.
13 Berg, 239 A.D.2d at 98, 670 N.Y.S.2d at 58.
14 Id. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 1192 and 511 respectively.
"s See People v. Huntley 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 179, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838
(1965) (establishing the Huntley hearing: a separate proceeding in a criminal
case wherein
[t]he Judge must find voluntariness [of the confession] beyond
a reasonable doubt before the confession can be submitted to
the trial jury. The burden of proof as to voluntariness is on the
People. The prosecutor must, within a reasonable time before
trial, notify the defense as to whether any alleged confession
or admission will be offered in evidence at the trial. If such
notice be given by the People[,] the defense, if it intends to
attack the confession or admission as involuntary, must, in
turn, notify the prosecutor of a desire by the defense of a
preliminary hearing on the such issue.).
Id. at 78.
16 Berg, 239 A.D.2d at 98, 670 N.Y.S.2d at 58.
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absence of Miranda warnings and granted defendant's motion to

suppress that evidence." On appeal, the County Court's decision
was reversed by the Appellate Division, Third Department, 8 and
further appeal was taken by permission. 9
This appeal focused on the federalP and New York State2 '
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. In general, this
privilege protects an accused "from being compelled to testify
against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a
testimonial or communicative nature."
Both federalP and New York State24 constitutions provide a

constitutional protection against self-incrimination that "[n]o
person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness

against himself." This protection or "privilege" bars the state from
compelling a person to provide "evidence of a testimonial or
communicative nature." s Thus, two essential elements must be
presented before an accused is afforded the protections of
Miranda.A First, evidence of a "testimonial or communicative
nature" must be elicited from the accused. Second, the custodial
interrogation "must reflect a measure of compulsion above and
beyond that inherent in custody itself.'
17Id.

18 Berg, 239 A.D.2d at 100, 670 N.Y.S.2d at 60.
19 People v. Berg, 92 N.Y.2d at 702,708 N.E.2d at 980,685 N.Y.S.2d at 907.
o U.S. CONST. amend. V ( stating in pertinent part: "No person... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... ').
21 N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 6 (stating in pertinent part- "No person ... shall ... be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... ").
' Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 582 (1990). See also Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966) (holding that the privilege protects an
accused only from being compelled to testify against himself).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V. See associated text note 20 supra.
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. See associated text note 21 supra.
2s Schmerber, 384 U.S at 761. See supranote 22 and associated text. See also
People v. Hager, 69 N.Y.2d 141, 142, 505 N.E.2d 237, 238, 512 N.Y.S.2d 794,
795 (1987) (holding that "[t]he privilege against self-incrimination bars the State
from compelling a person to provide 'evidence of a testimonial or
communicative nature.'" (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 761)).
See note 12 supraand accompanying text.
27 South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 (1983) (holding that a "refusal
to take a blood-alcohol test, after a police officer has lawfully requested it, is not
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"testimonial

or

communicative," it must reveal a person's "subjective knowledge
or thought processes."
The privilege is asserted "to spare the
accused from having to reveal, directly or indirectly, his
knowledge of-facts relating him to the offense or from having to
share his thoughts and beliefs with the Government."29 Physical
performance tests such as blood alcohol tests,30 balancing tests,3 '
and breathalyzers3P do not reveal a person's "subjective knowledge
or thought processes but, rather, exhibit a person's degree of
' Thus,
physical [performance] for observation by police officers."33
Miranda warnings are not required to allow the results of such
physical performance tests into evidence.3
an act coerced by the officer, and is thus not protected by the privilege against
self-incrimination"). See also People v. Thomas, 46 N.Y.2d 100, 107, 385
N.E.2d 584, 591, 412 N.Y.S.2d 845, 852 (1978) (holding "only evidence that
has been extracted from the defendant by compulsion in some form falls before
the constitutional proscriptions").
28 Berg, 92 N.Y.2d at 704, 708 N.E.2d at 981, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 909. See also,
Hager, 69 N.Y.2d at 142, 505 N.E.2d at 238. 512 N.Y.S.2d at 795 (1987)
(holding that for evidence to be considered "testimonial or communicative" it
"must itself, explicitly or implicitly relate a factual assertion or disclose
information").
29 Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201,213 (1988).
'o Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765 (stating "since the blood test evidence, although
an incriminating product of compulsion was neither petitioner's testimony nor
evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by the petitioner, it was
not inadmissible on privilege grounds").
"' Hager, 69 N.Y.2d at 142, 505 N.E.2d at 238, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 795. "The
defendant's responses to those [physical coordination, balancing and
breathalyzer] tests in this case indicated he had imbibed alcohol, not because the
tests revealed defendant's thoughts but because his body's responses differed
from those of a sober person." Id.
" Id See associated text note 31 supra.
31 See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764. "The distinction which has emerged., is
that the privilege [against self-incrimination] is a bar against compelling
'communications' or 'testimony' but that compulsion which makes a suspect or
accused a source of 'real or physical' evidence does not violate it." Id. at 774
(Warren, CJ., Black, Douglas, and Fortas, JJ., dissenting) (urging that the
report of the blood test was "testimonial" or "communicative" because the test
was performed in order to obtain the testimony of others who would
communicate facts to the jury about petitioner's condition). Id.
' Berg, 92 N.Y.2d at 702, 708 N.E.2d at 980, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 907.
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The unsettled question in the federal and New York State courts
is whether a person's refusal to take a sobriety test is, in fact,
"testimonial or communicative." The -Court of Appeals in Berg
did not "address whether defendant's refusal to perform the tests
' parroting the Supreme Court's evasion
was also non-testimonial"35
of the issue in South Dakota v. Neville.36 In Neville, a case
somewhat similar to Berg, the Supreme Court declined to address
the issue because "the distinction between real or physical
evidence, on the one hand, and communications or testimony, on
the other, is not readily drawn in many cases."'37 The Supreme
Court reasoned that the "situations arising from a refusal present a
difficult gradation from a person who indicates refusal by complete
inaction, to one who nods his head negatively, to one who states, 'I
refuse to take the test,' to the situation presented [Neville] where
respondent stated, 'I'm too drunk, I won't pass the test." ds Thus,
the Supreme Court in Neville and the Court of Appeals in Berg,
saved this discussion for another day and rested their decision on
the second Mirandaexception: the "compulsion" exception.39
The privilege against self-incrimination protects persons from
being "compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against"
themselves. 4 In order to qualify as "compulsion," a custodial
interrogation "must reflect a measure of compulsion above and
beyond that inherent in custody itself.'' New York's controlling
authority on this issue is the Court of Appeals' decision in

3IId. at 705,
36
37

708 N.E.2d at 984, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 910.

Neville, 459 U.S. at 561.
id.

3S Id.
39

Berg, 92 N.Y.2d at 705, 708 N.E.2d at 982, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 910. See also

Neville, 459 U.S. at 562 (stating "[s]ince no impermissible coercion is involved
when the suspect refuses to submit to take the test, regardless of the form of
refusal, we prefer to rest our decision on this ground ..
0 See notes 20 and 21 supra.
41 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980). See also, Neville, 459
U.S. at 564 (holding that "a refusal to take a blood-alcohol test, after a police
officer has lawfully requested it, is not an act coerced by the officer, and thus is
not protected by the privilege..

").
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Thomas.42 Thomas established that when a defendant refuses to
submit to a blood test, there is no "compulsion on the defendant to
refuse to take the test.., on the contrary, the compulsion is to take
the test."4 3
The Supreme Court in Neville noted that the compulsion inquiry
is not resolv&l by the fact that the government gives a defendant a
choice to submit to or refuse the test. Instead, the Supreme Court
qualified the compulsion inquiry by adding that unless the test is so
"painful, dangeus..or .severe. ... that almost inevitably a person
would prefer confession," the state can legitimately compel the
suspect, against his will, to accede to the test. " Thus, a bloodalcohol test is so safe, painless, and commonplace that the use of
testimony obtained from the test is not protected by the privilege.45
In keeping with Chief Justice Traynor's oft-cited observation
that it can be "scarcely contended that the police, who seek
evidence from the test itself, will tend to coerce parties into
refusing to take tests,"' the Berg Court determined that "there was
no direct compulsion on the defendant to refuse to perform the
field sobriety tests."'47 Thus, the Court of Appeals followed
Thomas and held that Berg's refusal "was not the product of a
legally cognizable compulsion" and allowed the test to be
admitted. 48
Berg attempted to distinguish Thomas on the ground that in
Thomas, a statute specifically authorized the admissibility of
evidence of a refusal to submit to a chemical analysis test, while no
42

People v. Thomas, 46 N.Y.2d 100, 107, 385 N.E.2d 584, 412 N.Y.S.2d 845

(stating "[i]t is only.., evidence that has been extracted from the defendant by
compulsion in some form that falls before the constitutional proscriptions").
41 Id. (emphasis added).

Neville, 459 U.S. at 563. But see Thomas, 46 N.Y.2d at 109, 385 N.E.2d at
592, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 854 (stating "[i]n being presented with the choice,
defendant was confronted with no impairment of any right enjoyed by him, for
he had no constitutional privilege not to submit to the chemical test").
45 Id.
I People v. Ellis, 421 P.2d 107 (1966).
47 Berg, 92 N.Y.2d at 706, 708 N.E.2d at 982, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 911. Although

this case involved field sobriety tests, the Court of Appeals found the holdings
dealing with chemical analysis tests persuasive. Id. at 705, 706.
48Id.
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such statute authorized the admissibility of one's refusal to take the
test in the context of field sobriety tests. The Court dispensed
with this argument and held that if evidence is constitutionally
permissible, the absence of statutory authorization does not make it
impermissible5 0
The Supreme Court, based on its decision in Neville, would
likely uphold the Berg result. In Neville, South Dakota's "implied
consent law"' specifically authorized evidentiary admission of a
person's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test.5 Additionally,
the law required police officers to inform the suspect of his right to
refuse.'
While in custody, Neville, an alleged drunk driver, was informed
by police officers of his right to refuse to submit to the bloodalcohol test, and that if he refused to take the test his license would
be revoked for one year? 4 The officer failed to warn Neville that
such refusal could be used against him at trial."
Neville argued that the officer's failure to fully inform him of the
fact that his refusal could be used against him at trial violated his
privilege against self-incrimination.56 Despite the fact that the
South Dakota law specifically required police officers to inform
49 See N.Y. VEH & TRAF LAW § 1194(2)(f) stating in pertinent part:
[e]vidence of a refusal to submit to such chemical test or any
portion thereof shall be admissible in any trial, proceeding or
hearing... but only upon a showing that the person was given
sufficient warning, in clear and unequivocal language, of the
effect of such refusal and that the person persisted in the
refusal.

Id.
-' Berg, 92 N.Y.2d at 706, 708 N.E.2d at 982, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
51

Neville, 459 U.S. at 556 citing S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 32-23-10.

52 Neville, 459 U.S. at 556, 557 (Stevens and Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (noting
that the State's opinion rested on an independent state ground and that the South
Dakota Supreme Court clearly held that the statute violated the state and Federal
constitutions).
' See supra note 51. Id.
54 Neville, 459 U.S. at 556 n.2.
5 Id.
56 Id. at 564. Neville also argued that the officer's failure to fully inform him
violated his Due Process rights. For the purpose of this discussion, only the selfincrimination issue is addressed. Id
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suspects of their rights, and the police officer failed to fully inform
Neville of those rights, the Supreme Court held that the refusal was
admissible at trial. 7 The Supreme Court reasoned that "the
warning he could lose his driver's license made it clear that
.refusing the - test was not a 'safe harbor', Iree of adverse
consequences.""s
The Supreme Court, presented with facts similar to Berg, and an
additional statutory requirement that the accused be fully informed
* of his rights, held that evidence of Neville's refusal was admissible
at trial." Given such results, it is likely the Supreme Court would
affirm the Berg decision.
DianneK.LeVerrier

7Id.
51
59

Id. at 566.
Id. at 564.
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